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ABSTRACT: The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (Innovation Center) was 
created by the Affordable Care Act to identify, develop, assess, support, and spread new 
approaches to health care financing and delivery that can help improve quality and lower 
costs. Although the Innovation Center has been given unprecedented authority to take 
action, it is being asked to produce definitive results in an extremely short time frame. 
One particularly difficult task is developing methodological approaches that adhere to a 
condensed time frame, while maintaining the rigor required to support the extensive policy 
changes needed. The involvement and collaboration of the health services research com-
munity will be a key element in this endeavor. This issue brief reviews the mission of 
the Innovation Center and provides perspectives from the research community on critical 
issues and challenges.
            
OVERVIEW
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (Innovation Center), autho-
rized in Section 3021 of the Affordable Care Act and located in the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), seeks to promote innovation in health 
care payment and delivery.1 It has a legislated mandate: 
to test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce 
program expenditures…while preserving or enhancing the quality of 
care furnished to individuals…(under Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program). In selecting such models, the 
Secretary shall give preference to models that also improve coordination, 
quality, and efficiency of health care services furnished…
The Secretary shall select models to be tested…where the Secretary 
determines that there is evidence that the model addresses a defined 
population for which there are deficits in care leading to poor 
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clinical outcomes or potentially avoidable 
expenditures.2 
To support the Innovation Center’s goals, 
the legislation provides $10 billion in funding from 
2011 to 2019 and enhanced authority to waive bud-
get neutrality for testing new initiatives. 3 The intent 
is to allow quicker and more effective identification 
and spread of desirable innovations, with the goal of 
ultimately modifying Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program in ways that sup-
port program-wide change. 
Though the strategic focus for the Innovation 
Center is still under development, there have been clear 
signals that its focus will be broad, with an emphasis 
on transformative change to address the “triple aim” 
of improving the quality of care, reducing cost growth, 
and enhancing population health.4,5 
Achieving this will be challenging and the time 
frame demanding in the face of historical experience 
in which years elapse between the origination of an 
idea and the process of designing, implementing, and 
evaluating. 
This issue brief focuses on three critical 
requirements the Innovation Center must address to 
meet its objectives: 
1. Focusing on change that matters; 
2. Documenting innovation to support effective 
learning and spread; 
3. Generating the evidence needed to support 
broad-based policy change.
Tensions between competing goals can be 
reduced by anticipating them and thoughtfully design-
ing the way innovations are tested and evaluated in the 
Innovation Center. Different trade-offs may be appro-
priate for innovations at different stages or with differ-
ent potential risks and rewards. Collaboration among 
researchers, innovators, and policymakers about how 
best to address different goals and potential tensions is 
needed to enhance the innovation center’s overall pros-
pects for success.
INTRODUCTION
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
(Innovation Center), as authorized by the Affordable 
Care Act and located in the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), seeks to promote innova-
tion in health care payment and delivery. To support 
the Innovation Center’s goals, the legislation provides 
$10 billion in funding from 2011 to 2019 and enhanced 
authority to waive budget neutrality for testing new 
initiatives. The intent is to allow quicker and more 
effective identification and spread of desirable innova-
tions, with the goal of ultimately modifying Medicare, 
Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) in ways that support program-wide 
change. 
Though the strategic focus for the Innovation 
Center is still under development, there have been clear 
signals that its focus will be broad, with an emphasis 
on transformative change to address the “triple aim” 
of improving the quality of care, reducing cost growth, 
and enhancing population health. 
FOCUSING ON CHANGE THAT MATTERS
The Affordable Care Act provides $10 billion in fund-
ing to support the Innovation Center’s goals. This is 
a substantial amount, but it is less than 0.1 percent of 
projected federal Medicare and Medicaid spending 
through the end of this decade and a much smaller 
proportion of the projected $32 trillion in total health 
spending over the same period.6 This small percentage 
stands in contrast with the much higher proportion of 
industry revenues devoted to research and development 
in the pharmaceutical industry and in other industries 
in which innovation is a central focus, like technology 
and communications.7 Neither this level of funding nor 
available staff is likely to be sufficient to invest in all 
the innovations that might be considered, so priorities 
must be set. Priority setting is a policy rather than a 
research decision, but research can help lead to better 
decision-making. Input from the research community is 
therefore an important element from the beginning of 
the innovation process.
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To achieve its statutory goals, the Innovation 
Center must identify as priorities those innovations 
that have the potential to achieve demonstrably large 
positive impact on quality and costs, as measured by 
a combination of improved outcomes and reduced 
costs. Innovations can be successful either by generat-
ing large gains over a relatively small population or 
smaller gains over a large one. The relative merits of 
the gains that may be achieved by different strategies 
vary and may depend on their administrative costs and 
whether they are fixed or vary with the size of the pop-
ulation. In any case, the research community can con-
tribute to the determination of the potential net gains 
from alternative pilots, as well as to the development 
of measures that can be used to monitor and assess the 
performance of those pilots. 
DOCUMENTING AND LEARNING FROM 
INNOVATION
The Innovation Center’s success depends not just on 
developing and implementing innovations but on the 
ability to monitor and evaluate innovations to provide 
evidence of their success and information to encourage 
widespread adoption. This is unlikely to occur without 
clear articulation of the essential logic of an innova-
tion, how it is intended to operate, and—perhaps most 
important—the results it is expected to produce and 
how success can be recognized. It is important to docu-
ment the context in which an innovation was tested and 
assess how important that is to its success or applica-
bility elsewhere so that those who may be considering 
it have an explicit understanding of the potential gains 
and associated costs they may experience.
Careful Planning and Clear Definition of 
Success
An innovation’s goals must be expressed in concrete, 
measureable terms that are linked to a time frame that 
provides a basis for monitoring performance and deter-
mining success. Essential elements of success include 
an explicit understanding of the activities needed to 
generate the anticipated outcomes; how the activities 
are logically connected to outcomes; the environment 
and context; and any potential obstacles and how they 
will be addressed. 
Unless innovations are well defined and their 
connections to desired outcomes are well understood 
from the start, it will be difficult to achieve success. 
Even if positive outcomes are achieved, it will be dif-
ficult to assess the relevance of those results to other 
settings and to replicate them throughout the health 
system. Unfortunately, such clarity is often lacking or 
limited, with critical design elements and site-specific 
characteristics unstated, key details driving success or 
failure potentially omitted or unrecognized, and the 
likelihood of success low because interventions are 
insufficient in scope or scale to achieve their intended 
effects.8 These limitations frequently can be traced to 
the lack of necessary data systems and measures and 
the need for methods that can produce more flexible 
and timely, accurate analysis. 
Tracking Implementation and Performance 
Innovations rarely remain fixed over time. Key fea-
tures are likely to be modified as experience grows or 
problems emerge. Time frames may depart from those 
anticipated. Objective short-term indicators of imple-
mentation success provide a basis to judge whether 
midcourse refinements may be valuable. Documenting 
what actually was implemented versus what was ini-
tially sought is critical for interpreting the lessons 
from testing and providing the basis for future spread. 
Case studies of implementation experience also can be 
invaluable to others that may seek to replicate or build 
upon what was learned from a given experience.
Supporting Timely Measurement 
The success of rapid-cycle change depends on mea-
surement—capturing and feeding back timely data on 
change after the launch of an innovation that allows 
fine tuning of the project, early insights on additional 
questions for analysis, and ongoing communication and 
the potential to learn from failure and success. Prior 
demonstrations highlight the challenges in securing 
timely data. For example, in the Medicare Physician 
Group Practice demonstration, financial results were 
4 the CoMMonwealth Fund
not available for almost a year after the initial perfor-
mance year; data to inform quality bonuses took even 
longer (Exhibit 1).9 
Making use of data generated naturally in the 
course of administering an innovation on a real-time 
basis can lessen delays. For example, sites often will 
have real-time information on use of services and hos-
pital admissions, registries that may document who 
was eligible for an innovation or served by it, and data 
on patient feedback. Sponsors of Vermont’s all-payer 
medical home demonstration say their ability to lever-
age existing administrative processes to capture data 
was critical to reducing providers’ costs of participa-
tion and enhancing the timeliness of information feed-
back.10 Effective use of such data is likely to require 
advanced planning. In a different effort, evaluators 
provided sites with a workbook tool for generating 
measures, including definitions of numerators, denomi-
nators, and the included population.11 An alternate 
strategy that can enhance data quality and consistency 
is to work with payers and providers to aggregate data 
they receive in a centralized fashion and feed it back to 
providers in a consistent and timely way so that they 
can monitor and manage what they are learning from 
their efforts at innovation. 
However data flow occurs, the process for data 
exchange and the format and content of reports should 
be decided up front and structured so data are useful 
for providers. Analyzing the data before implementa-
tion also can help with setting benchmarks and inter-
mittent milestones.
Investing in Shared Metrics and 
Documentation 
Developing the capacity to assess innovations also 
requires a concerted effort to develop metrics and doc-
umentation.12 To facilitate this process, CMS should 
identify common variables that are needed across all 
sites testing specific kinds of innovations and standard 
metrics that will facilitate aggregation and comparison 
of performance across sites. This includes outcome 
metrics relevant to all innovations and critical data that 
identifies design elements included in particular inno-
vations, the settings in which they are employed, and 
other variables relevant to their success. Evaluations 
that include structured study of implementation typi-
cally address such concerns, but they have not histori-
cally included the kind of timely feedback that the 
Innovation Center likely will require.
Targeting Learning to Achieve 
Stakeholder Buy-In 
If the lessons of an innovation speak to the interests of 
diverse users and stakeholders, widespread adoption is 
more likely. Successful replication of innovations will 
require addressing the concerns of critical participants. 
For example, providers will want to understand the 
operational demands of any innovation, how their rev-
enue streams will be affected, and whether change will 
help or hinder them in achieving institutional goals. To 
complement the analysis of results, case studies from 
objective researchers can provide important insight 
into the key factors contributing to successes and chal-
lenges from the perspectives of multiple stakeholders. 
Setting Realistic Expectations
Implementation almost always takes longer than 
expected, with modifications occurring along the way. 
The larger the scope of an innovation, the greater the 
complexity of the organization, and the more units 
or organizations involved, the more time is likely 
required for ramp-up. Personnel must be recruited or 
trained, approvals obtained, and participants defined 
and recruited. Delays may occur because of personnel 
Exhibit 1. Time Line for the Medicare Physician 
Group Practice Demonstration
Source: Adapted from a presentation by Mark McClellan at a Roundtable on 
Methods for Identifying, Designing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Innovations, 
Washington, D.C., Nov. 17, 2010.
Design Implement Evaluate
Diffuse
and
Spread
Design: Obtain authority from Congress, develop design, select sites, get 
Ofce of Management and Budget approval for waiver (2000–2005)
Implement: Implement program and collect operational data (2005–2010)
Evaluate: Evaluate initial effects (2006), two-year results (2009), and 
nal outcomes (2011–2012 and beyond)
Diffuse and Spread: Disseminate effective payment practices nationwide 
(2011–2012 and beyond)
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change (e.g., loss of the champion or key source of 
leadership and support), competing organizational pri-
orities that limit access to resources, or new issues that 
require design modifications. If Medicaid or CHIP is 
involved, state policymaker buy-in and approvals may 
be required and time may be lost reconciling different 
concerns that may exist in cross-state demonstrations. 
Although careful planning prior to implemen-
tation is always required, pilots and demonstrations 
are not conducted in controlled environments and the 
implementation process must allow for adjustment to 
contingencies as they arise. This requires flexibility on 
the part of the entities and individuals directly involved 
in the innovation but also on the part of researchers 
responsible for evaluating initiatives and policymakers 
who will be acting on the results.
Emphasizing Clarity of Objectives and 
Timeliness of Implementation 
Organizations are more likely to be able to imple-
ment innovations that are clear and simple. Successful 
innovation can be enhanced by avoiding unnecessar-
ily complex elements or requirements and by limiting 
standardized features to those most essential to success 
and common analysis of cross-site activity. In any case, 
the objectives must be set in a way that all stakeholders 
understand and agree. 
Timeliness in the implementation process is 
also important. Momentum can be critical to organiza-
tional success; once organizations are poised for action, 
delays can be very damaging to underlying stakeholder 
support. Delays can be minimized by streamlining 
processes between the announcement of an initiative 
and its implementation and by developing common 
procedures and approaches that work across a variety 
of innovations.
GENERATING THE EVIDENCE NEEDED TO 
SUPPORT BROAD-BASED POLICY CHANGE
The Affordable Care Act enhances the authority of the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to modify 
payment and selected program policies for the pilots 
being conducted by the Innovation Center.13 However, 
the ultimate goal is to encourage better ways of financ-
ing and providing care throughout the health system, 
many of which are expected to require a shift away 
from the current fee-for-service payment methods 
under which providers are paid now, not only by 
Medicare and Medicaid, but also by other payers.14 
While the Secretary has the authority to make changes 
in Medicare without going back to Congress, she must 
be convinced change is warranted by its demonstrated 
potential to improve quality and the CMS actuary must 
be willing to certify that, at a minimum, it will not add 
to program costs. Considering the level of concern 
about the federal budget, costs are likely to be a major 
focus and generating definitive evidence of the effects 
on program costs is likely to be a particular challenge. 
One key question to consider is what standard 
of evidence is likely to be required to support such 
decision-making and how evaluations should be struc-
tured to generate it. This issue is critical to the design 
and conduct of effective evaluations, and it will be an 
important factor in the Innovation Center’s ability to 
carry out its mission. 
Historical Context
Historically, the effectiveness of an intervention has 
been assessed using relatively rigorous research meth-
ods that evaluate the actual (versus intended) effects 
of demonstrated program change on desired outcomes, 
such as the triple aims of better health, better care, and 
lower costs. This typically has involved independent 
evaluation by contracted researchers employing several 
basic elements, including:
• Careful definition of the target population and 
how it is to be assessed for purposes of judging 
success;
• One or more comparison populations or control 
groups to serve as a benchmark for indicating 
what might have happened in the absence of the 
change;
• Metrics defining the outcomes of interest and 
how they change over time, which often require 
new forms of data collection or unique data files 
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developed from existing claims or other pro-
gram data; and
• Long time frames designed to distinguish imme-
diate effects from more stable, longer-term 
effects. Five-year time frames have been com-
mon, though some initiatives have been assessed 
more rapidly. 
The evaluation designs seek to distinguish 
true effects of an innovation from those that can be 
explained by other factors like secular trends, changes 
in patient mix, or other contextual change. In other 
words, they try to isolate the impact of the innovation 
compared with what would have been expected to 
occur in its absence. 
The size of the target population and the con-
trol group is an important design factor. Large popula-
tions are helpful in developing statistically valid esti-
mates of effectiveness and in distinguishing subpopula-
tions most likely to benefit from the innovation. The 
involvement of large populations, however, typically 
adds to the cost of an evaluation. 
Timeliness is another important factor. The 
design, development, implementation, and evaluation 
of an innovation can be a lengthy process. Exhibit 
2 illustrates the time line for Medicare’s Physician 
Group Practice demonstration, which was a model for 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program created in the 
Affordable Care Act. The more than 10-year time line 
is not dissimilar from the experiences of other demon-
strations. The time line can be shortened by develop-
ing clear goals for new pilots and explicit criteria for 
participating and streamlining the decision-making 
process, and establishing standardized metrics for mon-
itoring performance from data already available from 
claims and other sources. In addition, the methodology 
for identifying promising initiatives, monitoring per-
formance, and evaluating results should be examined 
for its ability to meet the needs of a process intended to 
produce rapid change. 
The Need for Timeliness and Rigor 
The legislation establishing the Innovation Center 
seeks to accomplish rapid-cycle change in health care 
delivery. This will require the ability to shorten the 
time needed to identify, develop, and assess innova-
tions with sufficient rigor to provide definitive evi-
dence that they can improve the quality of care while 
reducing costs. Such expectations will require some 
modification in the process that traditionally has been 
used to develop demonstrations and new methodologi-
cal approaches for assessing the performance of health 
care delivery systems and policies. 
Planning and Coordination
The Innovation Center gives CMS great flexibil-
ity to test potential policy changes. Effective use of 
such authority will require streamlining the process 
for developing and implementing pilot projects. It is 
important not to cut corners and take shortcuts that 
would threaten the validity of the process and to lay 
out a clear and consistent approach that can be accom-
plished with a minimum of unnecessary delay. 
Advanced planning is particularly important in 
this context. The establishment of clear and consistent 
goals for each initiative and a transparent and coordi-
nated mechanism for approving potential pilots can 
not only reduce the time needed to assess effectiveness 
but also help ensure they will, in fact, be effective. A 
key factor is the ability to provide an infrastructure for 
supporting new initiatives, so that the data needed for 
CMS to monitor the performance of pilots and for the 
pilot participants to manage the initiatives and gauge 
their own performance are available on a timely basis 
and in a useful format. 
Better coordination among the key stake-
holders in the process—both within and outside 
government—is also important. Many parties are 
involved in developing the innovative strategies that 
the Innovation Center will test, and the approval of 
the Office of Management and Budget, which often 
has been difficult to obtain, will still be necessary to 
conduct the pilots. Implementation will involve CMS 
and the participating sites, but also—in multipayer 
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initiatives—may include Medicare, Medicaid, private 
payers, and other stakeholders in the communities and 
at the national level. Evaluation of pilots will involve 
the Innovation Center and other CMS components, 
as well as the Office of the Secretary, which will be 
responsible for attesting to the quality of Innovation 
Center pilots, and the Office of the Actuary, which will 
be responsible for certifying cost-saving potential. 
Assessing Performance
With standardized evaluation procedures and better 
data, the time frame for evaluation could be shortened. 
This can be accomplished without cutting corners or 
sacrificing rigor, but by relying on an ongoing stream 
of information to monitor projects and make mid-
course corrections as well as reaching definitive con-
clusions about effectiveness. 
Making assessments over a shorter time period 
inevitably raises questions: will the effects observed 
over a shorter period be borne out over the long 
term? The assessment of pilots implemented by the 
Innovation Center must take this into account and bal-
ance the desire to have results quickly with the need to 
have an accurate picture of how these pilots work and 
the results they are likely to produce over time. 
Unless a change is very dramatic, its effects 
may not be immediate, so early assessments can 
result in discarding potentially promising innovations 
that would be proven effective if given more time. 
Conversely, some innovations may appear successful 
initially but the effects may be short-lived or offset 
by gaming or unintended results that are not appar-
ent until more time has elapsed. Different outcome 
measures also have inherently different time frames. 
Policymakers must consider these risks when applying 
Exhibit 2. Illustrative Time Line: Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration
Required Activity by Phase Relevance to Innovation Center Context
PRE-IMPLEMENTATION
Congressional Mandate (2000) The Innovation Center can proceed without explicit congressional approval but 
will still need to define priorities. 
Design (2001 to 2003) Aim is to encourage “bottom-up” planning but the Innovation Center will still need 
to decide which features to focus on within each priority area and how to structure 
metrics and criteria for success.
Site Selection (August 2003) The Innovation Center will need to establish standards for participation in pilots. 
Waiver Approved (October 2004) No new waiver is required, but there will be an internal process for approving 
flexible delivery and payment policies.
IMPLEMENTATION 
Official start to demonstration (April 2005)
Five-year demonstration ends March 2010 Less time is required for effects that are expected sooner. Rapid feedback can 
give indications of whether the innovation appears to be working as planned or 
needs fine tuning. Even shorter term outcomes, however, are likely to require 
continued monitoring, particularly if short- and long-term effects differ in important 
ways.
EVALUATION
Report of first-year results but no quality or expenditure 
data available to include (2006)
Report available with data on first two years of the 
demonstration covering April 2005–March 2007 (2009)
Final evaluation (expected 2011/2012)
Evaluations can build in early feedback loops and timely designs that support 
midcourse corrections and generate lessons for refinement and spread. Doing so 
requires mechanisms for collecting, processing, analyzing, and distributing data 
that are not currently in place. Appropriate balance needed between short- and 
long-term evaluation of progress and performance.
Note: Comments regarding how this experience would apply to the new CMMI mandate are the authors’ alone. 
Source: Presentation by Mark McClellan at Roundtable on Methods for Identifying, Designing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Innovations, Washington, DC, November 17, 2010. 
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the experiences of the Innovation Center nationally 
through changes in Medicare and Medicaid policy 
and whether the potential gains from adopting a fast-
tracked policy change outweigh the downside risk of 
adjusting the policy should subsequent longer-term 
evaluation warrant changes. The contributions of the 
health services research community will be extremely 
valuable in this area. 
Standards of Evidence and Their  
Related Risks
The standard-of-evidence issue involves making judg-
ments on the trade-offs of risks from different types 
of errors in interpreting pilot outcomes. There is a risk 
of judging change (e.g., an intervention or innova-
tion) to be effective when it is not. This type of error 
has obviously adverse implications: it can lead to the 
propagation of a model of payment and care that has no 
advantages relative to the current system or is perhaps 
worse. Another type of error creates the opposite result: 
rejecting an innovation as a failure when it is actually 
effective. This type of error can be very harmful as 
well because it delays or obstructs the implementation 
of effective initiatives that can improve the current 
system. 
Historically, most evaluations have been 
designed with the goal of limiting the risk of the first 
type of error. Some criticize this approach as overly 
conservative and insensitive to the second type of 
error, particularly when the objective is to find effec-
tive alternatives to the current system. There are risks 
from both types: moving too slow to encourage effec-
tive innovation or too fast to institutionalize innovation 
that may falsely believed to be effective. The appropri-
ate way to balance the two approaches varies with the 
context and the potential impact of each type of error. 
Changes that have greater potential to harm patients 
or add significantly to program costs must be guarded 
against. Where the gain-to-risk ratio is more favorable, 
an approach that leans toward proceeding with new 
approaches may be warranted, with policy fine-tuned 
as additional information is generated.
Evidence and Policy Change
Since the Affordable Care Act gives the Secretary 
(working with the CMS actuary) authority over 
decisions that previously were the responsibility of 
Congress, it is useful to review the standards of evi-
dence Congress historically has applied to authorize a 
change in program policy. 
A review of Medicare history shows that 
Congress often has enhanced important policy changes 
without solid evidence to support such changes. For 
instance, Medicare competition demonstrations were 
still being evaluated when program-wide authority for 
the Medicare risk contracting program was enacted 
in 1982.15 Congress enacted the Medicare hospital 
prospective payment system and changed national 
Medicare policy on hospital payment, citing New 
Jersey’s existing work with diagnosis-related group–
based payment to support the feasibility of change. 
But the details of the New Jersey system tested varied 
substantially from the Medicare model that was put in 
place so the national change, in fact, was based on rela-
tively limited testing.16 
Other changes, such as the introduction of a 
resource-based relative value schedule for physician 
payment, were not tested as much as built on research 
to define key parameters of the payment model and 
expert vetting involving a range of stakeholders. Some 
evaluations that have shown positive results (such as 
competitive bidding for durable medical equipment) 
have never been implemented globally because of 
organized opposition.17 In certain cases evaluations 
have proven negative—as with Medicare’s cost con-
tracts that were found to increase program costs—but 
the programs have been retained because they serve 
other valued objectives.18 Important changes in 
Medicare, like the authority for accountable care orga-
nizations, were enacted with relatively limited empiri-
cal support.19
This history argues against applying standards 
of evidence that are so technically rigorous that they 
impede real progress in improving the performance 
of the health system, which requires change on many 
dimensions.20 At the same time, clear and technically 
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defensible standards of evidence to support major 
changes in program policy can serve CMS well in its 
mission to reform the payment and delivery systems. 
Standards provide a way of navigating politically con-
tentious debates over change and provide the guidance 
necessary to appropriately target limited resources. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Timely evaluation that is targeted to important con-
cerns can help identify the kinds of innovations likely 
to make a big difference and support policymak-
ers to better structure the way they test innovations 
to enhance the ability to learn from such testing. 
Evaluation also can help answer the questions antici-
pated to arise in applying the lessons from testing to 
support program-wide policy change that will institu-
tionalize incentives to improve health care delivery and 
value.
It is important to keep in mind three conclu-
sions from assessments of past experiences dealing 
with evaluating finance and organizational changes. 
First, implementation itself is important. The evidence 
that alternative policies can be adopted and are feasible 
can be a powerful lever for change. The Innovation 
Center appears well-suited to developing such evi-
dence, by building systems that efficiently document 
the feasibility of innovation in forms that can be 
shared. 
Second, the quality of evidence likely to be 
generated by testing innovations will vary. Testing and 
evaluation practices likely to encourage high-quality 
evidence include: 1) clearly articulated models devel-
oped to assess program logic, including feasibility and 
plausibility; 2) ongoing measurement that provides 
information on relevant intended and unintended out-
comes associated with the innovation; 3) appropriate 
analysis that reinforces confidence that change can be 
legitimately attributed to the innovation rather than 
other causes; and 4) information on context and imple-
mentation experience to help others determine whether 
the innovation is likely to be appropriate in their setting 
and how to proceed. 
Third, there are inherent trade-offs involv-
ing flexibility, timeliness, and the ability to generate 
rigorous evidence that will enhance the confidence 
policymakers have about the effects of policy change. 
There is an important distinction between rigor and 
rigor mortis. Methodological rigor is extremely impor-
tant in distinguishing initiatives that are useful and can 
be propagated throughout the health system to good 
ends from those that “wish only to preserve the status 
quo.”21 But decisions about methodological rigor must 
not stifle all attempts to improve the health system on 
the grounds that no data are good enough and no risk 
is worth taking. Risks—albeit informed risks—must 
be taken to improve the health system and avoid the 
ever-intensifying pressure, not only on federal and state 
governments but also on businesses and households, as 
a result of increasing health spending without concomi-
tant improvements in quality and outcomes. 
Tensions between competing goals can be 
reduced by anticipating them and thoughtfully design-
ing the way innovations are tested and evaluated in the 
Innovation Center. Different trade-offs may be appro-
priate for innovations at different stages or with differ-
ent potential risks and rewards. Collaboration among 
researchers, innovators, and policymakers about how 
best to address different goals and potential tensions 
is needed to enhance the Innovation Center’s overall 
prospects for success. 
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